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Abstract 
 
This paper examines how Russian opposition activists negotiate online visibility—their own and that of their messages and 
campaigns—and the security concerns brought on by the pervasive digital surveillance that the state resorts to in order to reinstate 
its control over the online discursive space. By examining the internet-based presence and activity of the members of Alexey 
Navalny’s FBK (Anti-Corruption Foundation) and other opposition activists, the paper traces connections between everyday 
security practices that these activists engage in online and the resistance tactics and repertoires they enact in an environment 
where the free and open exchange of information on the Russian internet is becoming increasingly difficult. The analysis finds 
that Russian opposition activists place a high value on digital, media, and security literacy and that navigating the internet using 
security tools and protocols such as VPN, two-phase authentication, and encrypted messaging is increasingly seen as the default 
modus operandi for those participating in organised dissent in Russia to mitigate growing state surveillance. Furthermore, the 
analysis reveals that Russian activists have to balance the need for security with growing visibility—a key factor for entering the 
mainstream political and social discourse. The tension between being secure and being visible emerges as a key aspect of 
resistance practices in an environment of near-constant state surveillance, as activists concurrently manage their safety and 
visibility online to minimise the risks posed by government spying and maximise the effect of their dissent. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The practices of state surveillance in Soviet Russia were ubiquitous and consistently remained one of the 
main tools of influence and pressure on the embattled dissident movements throughout Soviet history. 
Unlike the Western tradition wherein independent media were meant to serve as watchdogs and civil 
society groups historically had the role of keeping authorities accountable, the Soviet regime saw the 
unrestricted circulation of information as a threat to be tightly controlled (Gorny 2007). This control was 
achieved through censorship of mainstream media and literary works, as well as through pervasive 
surveillance of communications. Soldatov and Borogan (2015) note that only select elites were permitted 
access to objective news or to foreign publications by the Soviet state, whereas ownership and use of 
technology such as photocopiers were highly restricted in an attempt to prevent the distribution of 
“subversive” material and literature, known as samizdat (Hanson 2008). At the same time, wiretaps and 
physical surveillance of communications and activities of key anti-regime dissidents were also common 
(Soldatov and Borogan 2015). 
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In modern Russia, the state’s preoccupation with exerting control over technologically mediated 
communications has become part of the national governance and security agenda. Indeed, some scholars 
have argued that the regime has morphed from one of communism to one of networked authoritarianism 
(MacKinnon 2011; Greene 2012), as the state now aspires to control all spheres of mediated social life 
while placing a high value on developing networked infrastructure and connectivity. With mainstream 
media largely run or co-opted by the state, the internet remains a relatively free but increasingly contested 
space for alternative opinions and dissent (Oates 2013). Dissenting internet users find themselves having 
to contend with a state surveillance apparatus that is growing in its sophistication and making use of the 
affordances of the internet for sharing information and performing identities (Gunitsky 2015). 
This study examines how Russian opposition activists negotiate online visibility—their own and that of 
their messages and campaigns—and the security concerns brought on by the pervasive digital surveillance 
that the state resorts to in order to reinstate its control over the online discursive space. Why are opposition 
activists suddenly publicly preoccupied with surveillance and security? And how are they dealing with 
these concerns while pursuing their activist agenda? Situating its inquiry at the nexus of technologies, 
practices, and publics, the paper draws on the concept of “media as practice” (Couldry 2004, 2012) that is 
increasingly being used to analyse protest politics as well (Mattoni 2016; Mattoni and Treré 2014). It 
considers how political activists can adapt and integrate the changing media practices in the hybrid media 
system, where the field of mainstream and alternative media and the field of politics interpenetrate 
(Chadwick 2013). In particular, Mattoni and Treré (2014) suggest using media practices as part of a 
conceptual framework to explain the interactions between the actors and their mediated environment in 
social movements at various stages of contention and at various levels of organisation. Among other 
things, this approach allows connection of the daily routine practices and short-term decisions of 
individual activists to the broader mechanisms of resistance at community, campaign, or movement levels. 
By examining the internet-based activities of Russian opposition activists, the paper aims to document the 
everyday security- and visibility-related practices that these activists engage in. It also seeks to explain 
how these practices inform the resistance mechanisms and tactical repertoires that the activist community 
comes to embrace in an environment where the free and open exchange of information on the Russian 
internet is becoming increasingly difficult. 
The paper first describes the emergence of Russia’s networked authoritarianism, explaining how the state 
relies on a system of “information controls” (Deibert et al. 2010) to manage the perceived threats to its 
authority posed by a free internet and a burgeoning civil society. It also reviews the state surveillance 
apparatus, its historical precursors, and its recent developments in light of an overall shrinking of the 
space for free expression and alternative political viewpoints in Russia. The paper then uses ethnographic 
observation of a range of public online practices by Russian opposition activists to draw conclusions about 
their strategies and tactics in negotiating state surveillance, managing their own digital (and physical) 
security, and maintaining visibility of their activism and resistance. The empirical research for the paper 
involves ethnographic observation of public opposition websites, Twitter feeds, YouTube channels, and 
Telegram channels in order to evaluate the tools and practices of opposition activists with regard to 
surveillance, security, privacy, and internet freedom. The observation is complemented by the analysis of 
relevant media coverage in Russia and beyond. 
The study finds that Russian opposition activists place a high value on digital, media, and security literacy. 
Navigating the internet using security tools and protocols such as VPN, two-phase authentication, and 
encrypted messaging is increasingly seen as the default modus operandi for those participating in 
organised dissent in Russia to mitigate growing state surveillance and create relatively safe spaces for 
activist organising and coordination. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that Russian activists have to 
balance the need for security with growing visibility—a key factor for entering the mainstream political 
and social discourse. They negotiate this high-profile visibility through the use of non-Russian social 
media platforms, hosting their content and conversations on multiple servers, including those outside of 
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Russia (Ermoshina and Musiani 2017), and making broad use of the internet’s affordances for real-time 
reporting and sharing. As a result, their heightened visibility and transparent security practices online 
underscore the contrast between internet freedom and the constraints imposed on it by Russian censors 
and law enforcement. These “strategic visibility” and “conspicuous security” practices also act as 
insurance against pervasive surveillance that endangers their livelihood and threatens to undermine their 
resistance work. The tension between being secure and being visible emerges as a key aspect of resistance 
practices in an environment of near-constant state surveillance, as activists concurrently manage their 
safety and visibility online to minimise the risks posed by government spying and maximise the effect of 
their dissent. 
Theorising Russia’s Networked Authoritarianism and State Surveillance 
 
It is fair to say that the overall climate of fear around state surveillance in Russia is not a new 
phenomenon. In fact, scholars of the Soviet Union have observed that state surveillance of its citizens was 
an essential aspect of Soviet political culture (Holquist 1997) and was embedded in society as a cultural 
practice, per Monahan’s definition of such as “an orientation to surveillance that views it as embedded 
within, brought about by, and generative of social practices” in a specific cultural context (Monahan 2011: 
496). Levina (2017) argues that surveillance was not only imposed as a top-down measure, but grew to be 
normalised and internalised by Soviet citizens and transformed into a kind of performative self-
surveillance. At the same time, we cannot discount the infrastructural work of the Soviet surveillance 
apparatus that worked in a “distinctly pervasive, interventionist, and active mode” (Weiner and Rahi-
Tamm 2012: 5) and gave birth to numerous state institutions, policies, and initiatives, many of them secret 
or semi-official. 
In its present form, the Russian state continues to place a high value on controlling information flows and 
managing or curtailing any expressions of dissent within the country’s public social life. To this end, 
Russian authorities employ a system of “information controls”—a concept coined by Deibert et al. (2010) 
and circumscribing a vast range of “techniques, practices, regulations, or policies that strongly influence 
the availability of electronic information for social, political, ethical, or economic ends” (Citizen Lab 
2015). Such a system of controls necessarily includes technical means such as “filtering, distributed denial 
of service attacks, electronic surveillance, malware, or other computer-based means of denying, shaping, 
and monitoring information,” as well as less definite measures such as “laws, social understandings of 
‘inappropriate’ content, media licensing, content removal, defamation policies, slander laws, secretive 
sharing of data between public and private bodies, or strategic lawsuit actions” (Citizen Lab 2015). This 
aligns closely with the surveillance studies perspective of the pervasive “culture of control” and David 
Lyon’s proposed definition of surveillance as “focused, systematic, and routine attention […] for purposes 
of influence, management, protection, or direction” (Lyon 2007: 14). 
In a similar attempt to systematise the state internet governance practices in Russia, Ermoshina and 
Musiani (2017) single out three main types of measures that they describe as “layers” of control. These 
include surveillance and “lawful interception” of telecommunications data from telephone and internet 
networks; restrictions on storing and importing user data within and beyond national borders; and finally, 
filtering and restricting access to particular websites on the basis of laws banning content such as child 
pornography, discussions of suicide, or extremist materials. Just like the information controls described 
above, these layers of measures are closely connected and operate in concert to grant the Russian state 
more power over the Russian-speaking segment of the internet, inching the country towards a 
“balkanised” internet (Ermoshina and Musiani 2017)—one where the user experience is increasingly 
fragmented and bound by local restrictions and national regulation. 
The multi-layered system of internet controls where surveillance plays a central role rests on a foundation 
of state governance imposing its control on an infrastructure that is chiefly built, owned, and maintained 
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by private companies, both Russian and international ones. In theory, internet service providers (ISPs), 
social network platforms, and search engines exercise a form of private governance over how online 
activity is regulated (MacKinnon 2012) through terms of service, privacy policies, and user agreements. 
But in practice, the Russian state frequently abuses its legal and regulatory power to shape and constrain 
these quasi-private online governance practices and seeks to conform them to its broader agenda of 
controlling the information flows and the digital technology undergirding them. As DeNardis notes, such a 
melding of state and private regulatory mechanisms enables “new forms of sometimes unaccountable and 
nontransparent power over information flows” (2014: 15), and in the case of authoritarian regimes, can 
lead to frequent abuses of such power as the state seeks to influence and coerce internet and 
telecommunications companies. 
It is important to note that Russia’s overall approach to internet surveillance and control is evolving in 
reaction to shifts in political and social climate. Deibert et al. (2010) identify three known generations of 
internet controls. The first generation resorts to straightforward blocking of websites (Russia’s internet 
blacklist registry1 is one example of this) to prevent access to content. The second one involves the 
creation of legal or technical frameworks to restrict access on a case-by-case basis (for example, through 
geo-focused internet shutdowns or temporary blocking of specific platforms or content). The third 
generation of controls combines the legal and technical tools with “effective counter-information 
campaigns which discredit or demoralize the opponent” (Deibert et al. 2010: 16): this includes Russia’s 
widely covered “information warfare” efforts (Thornton 2015), including state-sponsored media 
propaganda and more sophisticated efforts such as the online troll factory allegedly run with Kremlin 
support from an office building in Saint Petersburg (Toler 2015; Chen 2015).  
Though in the last decade Russia has mostly resorted to second- and third-generation controls and has 
avoided large-scale blocking, the Kremlin has consistently maintained its broad communications 
surveillance, extending its reach from telephone networks to internet infrastructure. Unlike the censorship 
component of recent state initiatives, which has raised considerable public debate, the details of state 
surveillance remain elusive, and significantly less information about them is publicly available. This aura 
of fearful mystery, coupled with systematic development of regulatory policies and technical solutions to 
curtail dissent in Russia while preserving some semblance of free expression, has led to what MacKinnon 
(2011) terms “networked authoritarianism”—a regime where the state is able to leverage cutting-edge 
techniques to police online speech and dissuade explicit resistance without resorting to crude mass 
blocking or filtering.  
In terms of fostering a surveillance culture, the Russian government has propagated several different 
normative ideas in an attempt to normalise citizen monitoring. One has been the narrative of pushing 
security interests over the value of privacy for individuals: this has been achieved through framing the 
internet as an inherently dangerous and risky space (Ognyanova 2015) and through presenting online 
content overall (often seen as an alternative to state-run media) as “unreliable” and “biased” (Kratasjuk 
2006; Ognyanova 2015). The other narrative, a more geopolitically flavoured one, is that of “online 
sovereignty,” wherein the state advocates for illiberal practices in internet governance arenas (invoking 
the “fourth-generation” information controls [Deibert 2016]), legitimising them as part of a global cyber 
warfare discourse. These narratives combine to shape the public perception of surveillance as a necessary 
evil and a safety measure, colouring Russian citizens’ perception of privacy, dissent, and free expression.   
                                                      
1 The blacklist of banned websites, or the “Unified Register of Domain Names, Internet Website Page Locators, and 
Network Addresses that Allow to Identify Internet Websites Containing Information Prohibited for Distribution in 
the Russian Federation,” is run by Roscomnadzor, Russia’s state internet watchdog. The blacklist database is 
accessible via a search form on https://eais.rkn.gov.ru/, and Russian internet rights organisation RosKomSvoboda 
maintains a mirror database at https://reestr.rublacklist.net/.  
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The analysis of opposition activists’ online strategies and activity in this study aims to understand how 
they manage these infrastructural, legal, and cultural challenges posed by the state surveillance effort and 
how they balance their own security and safety with the need to have a visible public presence in order to 
present to the public a viable alternative dissenting voice. 
Data Collection and Research Design 
 
This study is part of a larger exploration of the visibility and practices of activists and protesters in former 
Soviet states. Specifically, it applies an ethnographic approach to examine the practices and presence of 
Russian opposition activists in online spaces in the context of pervasive state surveillance. Netnography 
(Kozinets 2010) or virtual ethnography (Hine 2000) emerges as the most appropriate method to 
understand the networked media and discursive practices of a particular group (in this case, Russian 
opposition activists). It is a non-reactive approach (Salmonds 2015) that allows one to observe social 
media activity and the content it produces over delimited periods of time and to collect extant data without 
necessarily engaging with the subjects of observation. Observing how digital media platforms afford 
Russian opposition activists opportunities to address surveillance-related challenges or how they might 
limit their capabilities, both for security-related activity and for activist practices, informs the key 
objective of digital ethnography as it ultimately seeks to understand how people use technology in 
particular circumstances. 
The researcher employing netnography may operate primarily in the networked space of connections and 
communication exchanges rather than a geographic location or a physical site, yet material infrastructures 
and political systems (especially poignant in the case of pervasive surveillance) enmesh with the digital 
structures of networks, personal connections, and affordances of technologies, informing our 
understanding of the modern augmented reality in which surveillance and control, as well as dissent and 
counteraction, interpenetrate the worlds of atoms and bits. The study would have benefited from being 
supplemented by surveys or interviews with members of the activist community as this would have 
allowed the researcher to glean insights into motivations and decisions made by the members of the 
community behind the scenes. However, this is beyond the scope of the present study, which employs 
virtual ethnographic methods to analyse manifest (public) traces of mediated activist practices and relies 
on what has been disclosed, created, or shared in online public spaces. 
For the purposes of this study, unstructured ethnographic observation was conducted on a number of 
public social media accounts of the members of Alexey Navalny’s FBK (Anti-Corruption Foundation), 
based on the list of FBK staff on their website.2 The netnography sample also included the accounts of 
several other activists close to the organisation and working with FBK on digital security matters.3 The 
decision to study the digital mediated practices of this particular group was informed by the central role 
that FBK and Navalny’s supporters play in the Russian opposition movement (Laruelle 2014; Gel’man 
2015) as they bridge political and civic concerns (White 2015). The study is especially interested in seeing 
how a non-technology-centric and a non-internet-freedom-centric activist community (such as FBK) 
engages with issues of surveillance, privacy, and security, and what this might mean for how pertinent 
these issues are for Russia’s civil society overall. 
Virtual ethnographic observation for this study involved public opposition websites (https://navalny.com/, 
the main website of Alexey Navalny, and https://fbk.info/, the website of the Anti-Corruption 
Foundation); public Twitter feeds and Telegram channels of FBK staff, activists, and consultants; and 
                                                      
2 FBK’s official website at https://fbk.info/about/. 
3 The complete list of accounts is not being made public to protect the identities of the activists, many of whom are 
at risk of state pressure or repressions for their work. 
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FBK- and Navalny-created online video programming on the public Navalny LIVE YouTube channel.4 
These platforms were observed in order to evaluate the tools and practices of opposition activists, as well 
as to analyse how these practices allowed the activists to engage with the issues of surveillance, security, 
privacy, and internet freedom. Where possible and necessary, quotes and observations from particular 
accounts have been anonymised. Social media observations were supplemented by a review of 
complementary media coverage of the opposition activists’ work for comprehensive analysis and 
triangulation, and this coverage is cited throughout the study findings where necessary. The overall 
objective was to observe and document the mediated activist practices of the FBK community and to 
amalgamate from the observations several overarching trends and themes that could inform our 
understanding of how Russian political activists strategically approach dealing with issues of security and 
visibility in an environment of pervasive digital state surveillance. 
Because of temporal limitations and the scope of the research project, the observation was constrained to 
the period between August 2016 and August 2017. Nonetheless, this time period included some 
milestones, such as several protest rallies and Navalny’s embattled campaign in the run-up to the 2018 
presidential elections. 
The study’s findings indicate that Russian opposition activists accept state surveillance as part of their 
everyday existence but also craft strategic practices to manage their visibility and security in light of 
pervasive state spying and pressure. The next section discusses these key findings in greater detail. 
Security and Visibility Practices for Managing Surveillance 
 
The primary mission of Alexey Navalny’s non-profit FBK is to investigate, expose, and fight “corruption 
among high-ranking Russian government officials” (Anti-Corruption Foundation 2017a). In addition to 
the NGO’s core staff of about thirty people, Alexey Navalny, who is himself a lawyer, also operates an 
election campaign headquarters network, with a central Moscow office and regional outposts. This 
network stemmed out of his initial bid to run for Moscow mayor in 2013 (Oliphant 2013) but has grown as 
he fought to gain access to the presidential electoral race set to finish in March 2018, despite his battles 
with Russian courts over fraud and embezzlement convictions that Navalny claims are politically 
motivated (Moscow Times 2017).  
Throughout their investigative activity and campaign efforts, Navalny’s team and the community that 
emerged around it have made extensive use of digital tools and social media and have proven themselves 
to be savvy in harnessing the power of internet-enabled communications. Unlike digital rights activists 
such as RosKomSvoboda, Society for Protection of the Internet, or the Pirate Party in Russia, FBK and its 
allies have never explicitly made it their mission to fight internet censorship or to raise awareness of the 
Kremlin’s crackdown on free expression online. And yet, over the recent year and a half, the activities on 
FBK-affiliated online platforms have shifted to include practices dealing with physical and digital 
surveillance, online censorship and its circumvention, and hacking attacks on activists, as evident from the 
“Conspicuous Security Practices” section below.  
Why are opposition activists suddenly publicly preoccupied with surveillance and security? And how are 
they dealing with these concerns while pursuing their activist agenda? The study finds that, while FBK 
activists come to accept state surveillance as routine and inevitable, they also devise security strategies to 
counter it, promote digital literacy, and employ conspicuous tactics to minimise the threat of government 
spying. Activists complement these security practices with strategic use of their public communications 
channels, transparent financial reporting, and counter-surveillance of state officials. These practices allow 
                                                      
4 https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgxTPTFbIbCWfTR9I2-5SeQ 
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for heightened but more controlled visibility that, coupled with their security practices, emerges as a 
mitigating mechanism in the face of pervasive state surveillance. 
Surveillance as the Norm 
In modern Russia, which inherited much of the Soviet state’s institutional infrastructure and many of the 
cultural constructs from the Soviet period, we can observe a similar trend towards the normalisation of 
telecommunications, digital, and internet surveillance. Russia’s state security bodies have made use of the 
narratives about safety, security, and the threats of terrorism and “foreign agents” propagated by the state 
propaganda machine (and the federal state-run media channels in particular), making security their top 
argument for pervasive surveillance of both public and private lives of Russian citizens. Such 
normalisation of surveillance has involved infrastructural, legal, and other measures. 
The backbone of digital surveillance infrastructure in Russia, the System of Operative Investigative 
Measures (SORM), was introduced in 1995, mandating all telecom operators and internet service 
providers to install Federal Security Service (FSB)-provided hardware to monitor metadata and contents 
of private communications such as phone calls, email traffic, and web browsing activity (Privacy 
International 2013). Failing to provide Russian security services with access or to share data could lead to 
a revocation of an ISP’s licence. Since 2012, SORM has also applied its traffic-monitoring capabilities to 
social networking websites (Soldatov and Borogan 2015), and while its filtering mechanism is said to be 
flawed, Russian digital rights activists today operate under the presumption that “any information shared 
on Russian social networks like VKontakte or Odnoklassniki is collected by the intelligence services” 
(Maréchal 2017: 33). As of 2014, the FSB has begun installing new SORM-3 (third-wave) equipment, 
allegedly with Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) capability and provisions for long-term data storage 
(Soldatov 2017). However, comparatively little official information on SORM and its capabilities is 
available, lending it the same clandestine aura as that of the Soviet wiretapping systems that were its 
precursors. 
With regards to legal norms, Russian lawmakers and officials have adopted a number of legislative acts in 
recent years that contribute to the normalisation of state censorship and surveillance in digital spaces, both 
for organisations, such as media outlets and NGOs, and for private citizens. These include the infamous 
bloggers’ law that required popular bloggers with over three thousand daily views to register with the state 
and disclose their personal information (Lokot 2014); the law creating a state-run list of “organisers of 
information distribution” and requiring social network websites, portals, and similar sites to register and 
share certain data with the state; measures limiting anonymous use of public Wi-Fi networks and banning 
sales of prepaid SIM-cards to customers without state IDs. Some of the most damaging surveillance-
oriented legislation has been passed just in the past several years and includes the data localisation law 
that came into force in 2016 and requires internet companies to store Russian users’ data on servers 
located within Russia. Though some companies (for example, Viber, Booking.com) have complied with 
the demands, others (such as Facebook and Twitter) have yet to move to do so and face potential fines or 
blocking: the professional social network LinkedIn has already been blocked in the country for failing to 
move Russian users’ data to Russia (Lunden 2016). Another major recent surveillance tool—the so-called 
Yarovaya Law passed in the summer of 2016 and taking effect in 2018 (Luganskaya 2017)—is an “anti-
extremism” package of amendments that includes anti-dissent measures such as increased sentences for 
the use of “extremist” language online, a push for internet companies to share encryption keys with the 
state and to decrypt user communications, and requirements to store user data (content) for six months and 
metadata for up to three years. Most recently, in July 2017, Russian lawmakers voted to ban anonymous 
use of messenger apps and services (Meduza 2017), further broadening the surveillance powers of Russian 
security services and law enforcement. 
These legal and technical developments contribute to the routinisation of surveillance (Lyon 2007) in 
Russian society, and this has an impact on activists as well. A persistent theme in the online practices of 
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FBK activists and their allies in the past year is their acknowledgment of the growing number of 
surveillance-related threats and attacks on their community. The activists document these attacks and 
threats meticulously in public social media posts, offering details and speculating about the reasons for the 
surveillance, the possible perpetrators, and their connections to the state. Examples of surveillance include 
physical monitoring such as individuals following Navalny campaign activists and even premeditated 
physical attacks. Navalny’s website documents such an attack on the partner of FBK lawyer Lyubov 
Sobolev, who was attacked by an unknown assailant near their home and drugged in November 2016 
(Navalny 2016). Documented examples of combined physical and digital surveillance include plain-
clothes law enforcement officers filming participants of protest rallies (on March 26, July 23, and August 
26, 2017) with digital cameras and later detaining them based on video evidence, as well as confiscating 
computers and other data-storing equipment from FBK and campaign headquarters in Moscow and around 
Russia. 
Activists also document multiple examples of networked surveillance, based around digital platforms and 
employing digital tools. These range from innocuous keyword-triggered Twitter bots (replying to tweets 
critiquing certain officials) to more serious instances such as the monitoring and closure of e-payment 
accounts that FBK and Navalny used to solicit donations and crowdfund investigations and the hacking of 
private email inboxes. Navalny’s own email was hacked by “Hacker Hell” in 2012 (Navalny 2015), and 
content from the emails was subsequently used in court proceedings against Navalny, which he claims are 
fabricated. Other examples include the attempt to hijack the Telegram accounts of several high-profile 
activists in April 2016, including Georgiy Alburov, head of investigations at FBK, and civic activist Oleg 
Kozlovsky (see Figure 1). This particular case was investigated by the victims and their allies in great 
detail and their digging led them to conclude that the mobile provider MTS cooperated with Russian 
security services and attempted to remotely hack their accounts by tampering with Telegram’s SMS login 
feature (Lokot 2016). The activists believed intruders wanted to gain access to their personal 
communications, including contact lists, and even announced they intended to take the provider to court. 
Such extensive documentation of instances of state surveillance provides the activists with an opportunity 
to reflect on how secure their communications and information are and to raise awareness of security 
issues among their followers and supporters. The next section details how Russian activists become 
intentionally overt in their security practices. 
Conspicuous Security Practices 
The examples above combine into a stark canvas of an environment of normalised surveillance practices 
exercised by the Russian state against those it sees as threats to its hegemony. However, the FBK team 
and allied opposition activists do not simply document the instances of being watched, recorded, or 
hacked. While they admit state-perpetrated surveillance is broad and multi-pronged, they also adopt a 
more proactive position in addressing the attacks and threats by engaging in “conspicuous security” 
practices on their public online platforms. These practices are conspicuous because they emerge on 
platforms where previously discussion had centred only around issues of politics and state corruption. 
They are also conspicuous because activists explicitly and overtly acknowledge the fact of the surveillance 
and attempt to mitigate or minimise security risks posed by state spying, while also demonstrating in detail 
how this can be achieved.  
First, they use each suitable surveillance case to stage a public deconstruction of what happened and how 
one can avoid the same happening to them (as in the case with the attempted Telegram hacks). They also 
promote digital literacy and security literacy in other ways, offering advice, guides, and explanations 
about key security tools such as the Tor browser, end-to-end encryption, and two-factor authentication. 
Leonid Volkov, Navalny’s long-time ally and head of his election campaign, began hosting a regular 
online video segment on the Navalny LIVE YouTube channel called “The Cloud,” where he specifically 
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focuses on issues of online privacy, anonymity, and security, often bringing on expert guests such as 
security experts and digital rights advocates (see Figure 2). In Volkov’s show segments, as well as on their 
Telegram channels, FBK staff and allies often offer advice on using specific anti-surveillance tools, such 
as VPNs and proxy services (Navalny LIVE 2017). 
Other examples of conspicuous security practices employed by FBK activists include moving away from 
Russia-based online services and moving their content and activity to servers and platforms outside of 
Russia. After Navalny’s official website was briefly blacklisted in Russia in 2015, and especially with the 
advent of the Russian data localisation law, opposition activists focused on moving all possible resources 
to hosting providers outside of Russia, as well as making use of social media platforms that have not 
conceded to storing Russian users’ data inside the country. Activists have taken the time to explain their 
decisions and discussed the use of platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and Telegram in the 
context of Russia’s environment of political repressions and the tightening space for online free 
expression. 
Finally, FBK and other opposition activists practice conspicuous security by directly involving themselves 
in the development and creation of digital security and anti-surveillance tools and by supporting others 
who wish to lend their hand to improve the community’s digital arsenal. This is in line with Lysenko and 
Desouza’s observations about the co-evolutionary nature of state surveillance and counter-protest 
measures and activist ICT-enabled tactics to overcome counterrevolutionary and restrictive measures in 
the former Soviet Union states (Lysenko and Desouza 2014). Such projects include the Red Button, an 
app developed by a team led by Alex Litreev, an IT expert and FBK consultant, in April 2017 (Litreev 
Figure 1. Screenshot of a security message from Telegram warning of 
hacking attempt. Image courtesy of Oleg Kozlovsky on Twitter. 
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2017). The app allows protest and rally participants to react quickly in cases of police pressure and to let 
their friends and family know they have been detained. Another project is the Telegram-based VPN bot 
developed by Vladislav Zdolnikov, a long-time FBK contributor and IT-entrepreneur (TgVPN 2017). The 
bot, launched in May 2017, allows for quick delivery of VPN services via Telegram messenger and offers 
an easy way to begin using the anti-surveillance technology that also allows access to websites banned in 
Russia. Most recently, Navalny’s campaign headquarters organised a hackathon (a collaborative coding 
and prototyping event) for activists and volunteers to develop digital solutions for the campaign and the 
activist community around it (Navalny 2017).  
 
Public management of state surveillance through explicit acknowledgment, analysis, and mitigation of 
risks makes these security practices conspicuous given FBK’s usual online activity as political and anti-
corruption activists. But how do they negotiate security and risk awareness while also being highly 
visible? 
Strategic Visibility Practices 
The focus on raising awareness of surveillance and offering tactics to mitigate it and increase digital 
literacy through conspicuous security practices is further buttressed as a surveillance management tactic 
by strategic choices that FBK activists and their allies make about their public visibility in online spaces. 
This focus on “strategic visibility” is intentional, as the tensions between private and public lives and 
spaces of Russian dissidents and citizens go back in history. Siegelbaum notes that in totalitarian regimes 
(of which the Soviet Union is an example), the state exerts “an all-embracing despotic interference in all 
manifestations of life” and that the Soviet period was characterised by “a balanced system of total 
surveillance” (Siegelbaum 2006: 2), but he also cautions against false dichotomies in the public–private 
debate. Indeed, the public and private spheres in the lives of Soviet citizens were complex and often 
multiple, as exemplified by the co-existence of the official and informal publics (Zdravomyslova and 
Voronkov 2002) and the dissonance between centralised state surveillance and the doublethink and 
performative self-surveillance of the everyday Soviets (Levina 2017). 
Figure 2. Screen grab from YouTube talk show “The Cloud,” hosted by 
Leonid Volkov, explaining the basics of the Tor network. Episode 002 
was devoted to online anonymity and circumventing website blocks. 
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To some extent, the advent of the internet has granted ordinary citizens, and Russian dissidents in 
particular, a greater measure of control over their private sphere and their public image, but the state has 
been quick to move in on the free territory. As the activists find their private spheres under threat of 
constant surveillance as much as their public work, they choose to exercise the control they do have online 
over what to reveal and to what effect. Such strategic visibility work often seeks to forestall state-
sanctioned leaks or accusations of unscrupulous activity thrown against the opposition members. In this 
way, by taking back some control and being visible on their own terms, the activists’ visibility practices 
serve as a mechanism of resisting the state surveillance apparatus. The observation and analysis of public 
online activities of the FBK community and their allies allows one to outline four different kinds of 
practices that contribute to the community’s strategic visibility mechanism: 
1. Networked sharing: As a combined measure against both state censorship and state 
surveillance, FBK and other opposition activists actively use all available informal channels 
to remain visible and accessible. As they are basically barred from state-run federal media and 
exercise little control over state media narratives, they resort to alternative channels such as 
Telegram messenger and Facebook. They frequently post and share promos of their own 
investigative and activist content and on-the-ground activity, often produced in-house and 
then broadcast on YouTube or teased on Twitter. They also actively use memes and viral 
content, exploiting the networked logic of spreadable media (Jenkins, Ford, and Green 2013). 
2. Real-time content delivery: This strategy relies on the use of modern technology to enable 
things such as live streams from protests, live casting of interviews or daily news briefs, 
YouTube-powered online real-time shows, and updates on court hearings provided as live text 
blogs. Using unedited content delivered to the viewers or readers in real-time mode increases 
trust (as there are no edits) and allows activists to bypass mainstream media frames or silence. 
Especially for offline events such as protests and court hearings, if anything does happen it is 
immediately documented and made public, negating the need for surveillance as the activists 
make the choice in advance to be seen. For instance, the large-scale anticorruption protests on 
March 26, 2017, had FBK delivering syndicated live streams from rallies around Russia, 
showing both the scale and the breadth of the rallies, as well as documenting arrests and 
police brutality (see Figure 3). 
3. Radical transparency: As financial and operational surveillance of FBK work is widespread, 
the organisation and its community have made a conscious choice to be public and transparent 
about their funding, budgets, and other activity. They regularly publish financial reports 
(Anti-Corruption Foundation 2017b), explanations on how their campaigns were run, offering 
behind the scenes content, instructions on how to build and run campaigns or investigations, 
as well as photos and video reports from on-the-ground activity. Such radical transparency 
seeks to raise the level of trust among the community’s supporters, but also to neutralise 
ongoing and potential surveillance efforts by the state and security services aimed at 
extracting information that could be used to discredit the activists. 
4. Counter-surveillance: As part of their overall dissent strategy and activist tactics, FBK 
community members are actively engaged in counter-surveillance measures against state 
officials and security services. In their investigative anti-corruption work, they use public 
online records, social media data, and even volunteer-made drone videos to investigate 
Russian officials’ financial dealings and real estate and money-laundering schemes. Activists 
also engage in reverse surveillance of law enforcement during protest rallies by posting 
regular updates to social media and providing photographic and video evidence of police 
presence, police surveillance efforts, and any altercations or arrests. They also educate citizens 
about their rights with regard to documenting police presence at such events. 
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In a climate of normalised state surveillance, Russian opposition activists seek to retain some measure of 
control on the remaining discursive spaces in the online sphere. To continue their political and anti-
corruption work, they find they must now engage with issues of information security in public and 
conspicuous ways. But this strategic approach also extends to their own visibility online as a means of 
mitigating the risks of surveillance and retaining control over the outcomes of their actions and narratives. 
While some of the strategic visibility practices, such as counter-surveillance and networked sharing, are 
reactive, others, such as real-time broadcasting and radical operational transparency, seek to forestall state 
surveillance attempts and exercise power to shape the activist narrative on their own terms. By making 
both their security practices and their political work highly visible, Russian opposition activists offer their 
supporters new models of resistance to the state surveillance apparatus. 
Conclusions 
 
This study examined how Russian opposition activists, specifically members of Alexey Navalny’s FBK 
(Anti-Corruption Foundation) community, manage the persistent threats and risks posed by digitally 
enabled state surveillance in Russia’s conditions of networked authoritarianism. The study drew on the 
concept of media practices and its application to the study social movements to analyse the intersection of 
media technologies and actors in political contexts to consider how political activists adapt and integrate 
the changing media practices in the hybrid media system. By examining the internet-based activities of 
Russian opposition activists in light of the long history of state surveillance in Russia, the paper traced 
connections between activists’ everyday online security practices and the resistance tactics and strategies 
they enact in an increasingly hostile environment with shrinking space for free expression and dissent. 
Figure 3. Screen grab of YouTube live stream syndicated by FBK during the March 26, 2017, anti-
corruption protests in Russia. 
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The paper used virtual ethnography (netnography) to conduct observation of public opposition websites, 
related Twitter feeds, YouTube channels, and Telegram channels to capture a range of public online 
mediated practices of Russian opposition activists and to draw conclusions about the challenges they face 
while negotiating state surveillance, managing their own digital and physical security, and maintaining the 
visibility of their resistance efforts. The study also theorises about how these individual mediated practices 
can inform the broader mechanisms of resistance used by the activist community. In this way, the study 
contributes to existing research on surveillance in post-Soviet states by considering the implications of 
individual and community activist online practices aimed at managing state surveillance. The observation 
was complemented by the analysis of relevant media coverage in Russia and beyond. Though (virtual) 
ethnography has its limitations, it was a viable non-reactive approach to collecting data on public online 
activity of individuals and communities that has been used in the study of activism. Future research in this 
area could be expanded to involve surveys or interviews with members of the activist community in order 
to gain a deeper understanding of the motivations and decisions made about their online activities and 
strategies. 
The analysis found that in an environment where state surveillance is increasingly normalised, Russian 
opposition activists employ a number of practices to construct a mechanism of conspicuous security 
online. They promote digital, media, and security literacy and increasingly default to using security tools 
and protocols such as VPN, two-phase authentication, and encrypted messaging in their daily online work. 
Beyond digital literacy efforts, FBK activists employ conspicuous security practices by making public 
examples of known surveillance cases and attacks against them; by moving away from Russian social 
media platforms and services, and hosting their content and data on servers outside of Russia; and by 
directly participating in the development and creation of anti-surveillance and digital security tools. These 
literacy and security efforts underscore the ongoing battle for control over digital online platforms and 
their users between the state and its discontents. In Russia’s regime of “networked authoritarianism,” the 
state is becoming increasingly adept at using technology to police online speech and expressions of 
protest, while attempting to exert control over every sphere of mediated political and social life. 
Furthermore, the analysis revealed that Russian activists have to balance the need for security with the 
struggle for control over visibility, an important factor for entering the mainstream political and social 
discourse. However, visibility is traditionally seen as a necessary condition of surveillance, so activists 
must mitigate its threats while reaping its benefits. They make use of their visibility in strategic ways by 
exploiting the internet’s affordances for real-time reporting and networked message sharing; by engaging 
in radical transparency with regards to their funding and operational practices; and by employing a range 
of counter-surveillance measures against the state and security service apparatus. As a result, their 
practices online underscore the contrast between the possibilities offered by internet freedom and the 
constraints imposed on it by Russian internet censors and law enforcement.  
These tactics, therefore, illuminate the stark differences between online activism in democratic or free 
states and online activism in a networked-authoritarian state such as Russia. In democracies, activists avail 
themselves of the visibility the internet and social media afford to mobilise support for their cause or to 
draw attention to their messages. But in Russia, this dynamic is more complex. While allowing FBK and 
their fellow activists to raise their political profile and engage in productive dissent to some extent, their 
“strategic visibility” and “conspicuous security” mechanisms also act as insurance against pervasive 
surveillance that endangers their livelihood and threatens to undermine their resistance work. This tension 
between being secure and being visible is a key characteristic of online resistance practices in an 
environment of near-constant state pressure and oversight, as Russian activists concurrently manage their 
safety and visibility online to minimise the risks posed by government surveillance and maximise the 
effect of their activism. Further interdisciplinary research in other non-democratic or authoritarian states 
might consider extending this inquiry into online visibility and public activist practices as a means of 
resistance to or management of state surveillance. 
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